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DELAWARE LAW AS APPLIED PUBLIC 
CHOICE THEORY: BILL CARY AND THE 
BASIC COURSE AFTER 1WENTY-FIVE 
YEARS 
William W. Bratton* 
I. CHARTER COMPETITION, CARY, 
AND THE BASIC COURSE 
Twenty-five years ago the late William L. Cary used the pages of 
the Yale Law Journal to serve his famous indictment of Delaware 
corporate law. 1 His article reviewed Delaware's code and leading 
opinions of its courts and suggested that Delaware law had "no 
public policy left ... except the objective of raising revenue."2 To 
Cary, the "public policy" at stake was the integrity of corporate 
managers. 3 The state's revenue objective, he said, led it to "grant 
management unilateral control untrammeled by other interests,"4 
thereby sacrificing the national interest. Delaware was, in short, a 
corrupt sovereign. 
Cary's denunciation was soon countered by a commendation of 
Delaware articulated under the rubric of jurisdictional competition 
theory. 5 Under this theory, what Cary saw as subject matter for 
regulation in the public interest instead was seen as appropriately 
left to decisionmaking within firms-firms choosing among the 
various states for the best possible legal regime in which to 
' Samuel Tyler Research Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law 
School. The author was born in Delaware. 
1 William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE 
L.J. 663 (1974). 
2 I d. at 684; see also Comment, Law For Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law 
of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 861 (1969) (discussing how selling of Delaware's corporate laws 
is state business). 
3 See Cary, supra note 1, at 671-72 (noting that one focus of article was that "necessary 
high standards of conduct [by management] cannot be maintained by courts shackled to 
public policy based upon the production of revenue"). The managers' integrity is the 
competing public policy. 
4 Id. at 697-98. 
5 ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 32 (1993). 
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incorporate or reincorporate. 6 Such firms, said the theory, were 
seeking a predictable, cost-reductive legal regime.7 Delaware was 
said to provide this regime with comprehensive case law, well-
specified indemnification rules, and an expert judiciary. 8 The firms 
also were said to seek a guarantee that their domiciliary state would 
maintain its legal system's desirability. 9 A chartering jurisdiction 
remained free to change its politics and transform itself into an 
unresponsive domicile even as its domiciliary firms had incurred 
access costs ex ante. 10 To be competitive, a jurisdiction had to reduce 
this defection possibility by making a credible commitment to 
remain constant to its customer firms' interests. For Delaware, the 
requisite commitment followed from the combination of a large 
number of incorporations and a small population. 11 This situation 
caused franchise tax revenues to make up a substantial portion of 
its tax draw, 12 which in turn subordinated its politics to its charter-
ing business. 13 Delaware also invested in assets specific to its 
incorporation business-its code and case law and its judicial and 
administrative expertise-and set up internal process rules to 
protect these reputational assets from impairment by anti-
managerialist politicians and judges. 14 The capital, thus accumu-
lated and protected, bolstered Delaware's market position. Other 
states could not credibly precommit to offer superior service, and 
thus were deterred from incurring the start-up costs necessary for 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 33-34, 39 n.20. 
9 Id. at 32. 
10 See id. at 42-43 (giving example of New Jersey's corporate code revamping just after 
turn of century). 
11 The need for a "supermajority" of two-thirds of both legislative houses to change the 
Delaware code also helped. Id. 
12 I d. at 36-37. Franchise taxes amounted to 17.7% of Deiaware's total tax revenues in 
1990. Id. at 10. 
13 Id. at 38. 
14 These assets include directing corporate matters to a specialized chancery court, 
appointing rather than electing its judges, limiting judges to twelve-year terms, and requiring 
two-thirds majorities of both houses of its legislature to approve corporation code amend-
ments. Id . at 38-42. 
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entry into the market. 15 A first-mover advantage 1n Delaware 
resulted. 16 
This scenario still holds a central place in our working model of 
corporate law. But jurisdictional competition theory's concomitant 
assertion that charter competition assures optimal constraints on 
management misbehavior, the "race to the top" story, quickly went 
the way of history. The theory bypassed the problem of the share-
holders' lack of influence over state lawmaking processes with a 
reference to the control market deterrent: Management's option of 
exit through reincorporation in another state adequately disciplined 
the states, while the possibility of shareholder exit by tender to a 
hostile offeror adequately disciplined management. This tale could 
not be told after managers and state politicians collaborated17 in the 
1980s to hobble the . market deterrent with anti-takeover 
legislation. 18 It became manifest that management capture of the 
state lawmakers led to suboptimal corporate lawmaking in the 
midst of active competition for charters. 
Charter competition's proponents accordingly shifted to a middle 
ground position, defending the state system except to the extent 
that it permitted constraints on the market for corporate control. 19 
Other observers revived Cary's point that state corporate law should 
15 See id. at 40 (noting length of time would be "considerable" to equal Delaware legal 
expertise). 
16 Id. at 40-41, 43-44. 
17 See Roberta Romano, The Future of Hostile Takeovers: Legislation and Public Opinion, 
57 U. CIN. L. REV. 457, 461 n.ll (1988) (showing that although anti-takeover legislation is 
interest-group legislatiun, it did not result from efforts of centrally organized management 
lobbying effort but rather from individual corporation interests). 
18 For descriptions, see Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Takeover 
Law: The Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1168 (1999); Arthur 
Pinto, The Constitution and the Market for Corporate Control: State Antitakeover Statues 
After CTS Corp., 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 699 (1988); Elliott Weiss, What Lawyers Do When 
the Emperor Has No Clothes: Evaluating CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and Its 
Progeny-Part I, 78 GEO. L.J. 1655 (1990). 
19 See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAw 222 (1991) (concluding that race-to-top stands as refuted, but proposition 
that competition creates "powerful tendency" to enact shareholder beneficial laws remains 
vital); Roberta Romano, Law as Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. 
ECON. & 0RGS. 225 (1985) (trying to bring empirical research to bear no issue); Ralph K. 
Winter, The "Race for the Top" Revisited: A Comment on Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1526, 
1528 (1989) (expressing more confidence in view that Cary was wrong than in view that 
Delaware was leading race to top). 
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be preempted, at least in part. 20 The middle ground result, they 
said, developed from a defect in the charter competition system. 
Given the competition, the states had to focus on the variables that · 
influence reincorporation decisions. 21 That focus caused the states 
to cater to management preferences rather than concern themselves 
with the maximization of shareholder value. Accordingly, states 
pursued suboptimal policies of management accommodation 
respecting fiduciary rules and anti-takeover legislation.22 
This debate continues, directed to the question of the desirability 
of federal intervention.23 As such, the debate figures only peripher-
ally in my teaching. Federal intervention in corporate law does not, 
after all, hold a place on Washington agendas these days. At the 
same time, however, the operative description of Delaware lawmak-
ing under charter competition, to which there is little fundamental 
disagreement, takes a more prominent place in my pedagogy with 
each passing year. This prominence follows from the fact that 
Delaware's importance as the corporate lawgiver has increased in 
the quarter-century since the publication of Bill Cary's article. As 
Delaware cases take up a greater proportionate share of the 
syllabus, my description of corporate law becomes a description of 
characteristics of Delaware cases and of the personalities of 
Delaware judges. Charter competition figures prominently in that 
description. 
20 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State 
Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1435, 1495 (1992); Bebchuk & Ferrell, 
supra note 18; William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory Competition, 
Regulatory Capture, and Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1861, 1925-48 (1995); 
Roberta S. Karmel, Is It Time for a Federal Corporation Law?, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 55, 91-96 
(1991); see Joel Seligman, Essay, The Case for Minimum Corporate Law Standards, 49 MD. 
L. REV. 947,971-74 (1990) (proposing limited federal preemptive in three specific areas); see 
also Joel Seligman, The New Corporate Law, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 60-63 (1993) (suggesting 
need for concurrent federal legislation that does not entirely preempt state legislation). 
21 Bebchuk, supra note 20, at 1452, 1454. 
22 Id. at 1462-63, 1468, 1488. In addition, competition can cause the states to use their 
lawmaking power to impair market discipline even further, as the proliferation of anti-
takeover statutes demonstrates . Id. at 1467; see also Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. 
Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 
4 71, 483 (1987) (stating state competition generates efficient rules). 
23 A new empirical debate also can be expected in light of Robert Daines's paper, Does 
Delaware Law Improve Firm Value? (New York University Law and Business Working 
Paper, Oct. 1999) (finding statistically significant increment in value, measured by Tobin's 
Q, for firms incorporated in Delaware). 
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I also look to charter competition to explain Delaware's growing 
prominence in the basic course. I do so, however, without offering 
empirical evidence showing an increase in Delaware's market share 
of the charters of publicly-traded firms . Delaware's enhanced 
prominence as a corporate lawmaker does not require a bigger 
market share than the oft-stated figure of fifty percent. Instead, the 
enhanced prominence results from the nature of Delaware's 
customer base and the product it sells. Charter competition caused 
state corporate codes to converge in their broad outlines long ago. 24 
Delaware's code stands out more for its stability over time than for 
its clarity or state-of-the-art drafting. It follows that Delaware's 
case law, judges, and speedy process figure much more prominently 
than its code in explanations of the success of its legal product line. 25 
Studies of reincorporating firms confirm this assessment, showing 
that firms migrate to Delaware because they either anticipate 
activities that increase the risk of litigation or plan to engage in 
mergers and· acquisitions, the latter of course also being an activity 
that carries a high risk oflitigation.26 Couple this tendency with the 
consistent intensity of merger and acquisition activity during the 
last two decades, and Delaware emerges as a magnet that attracts 
litigation respecting mergers and acquisitions. The result is a stack 
of Delaware merger and acquisition cases that towers above the 
stack of cases reported by all other jurisdictions combined. 
Delaware's enhanced presence in the basic course reflects this 
fact, even without mergers taking a large time allocation in the 
syllabus. When I took the basic course twenty-five years ago, we 
read Cheff v. Mathes27 in connection with fiduciary duties and ran 
24 William J. Carney, Federalism and Corporate Law: A Non-Delaware View of the 
Results of Competition , in INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COMPETITION AND COORDINATION: 
PERSPECTIVES ON ECONOMIC REGULATION IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 153, 169-82 
(William Bratton et al. eds., 1996). 
25 Bayless Manning identified the judiciary as the prime attraction, comparing Delaware 
to the medieval law merchant. Andrew G. T . Moore II et al. , State Competition: Panel 
Response, 8 CARDOZO L . REV. 779, 784-85 (1987) (describing Manning's response in roundtable 
discussion). For confirmation of this point from a game theory perspective, see Ian Ayres, 
Making a Difference: The Contractual Contributions of Easterbrook and Fischel, 59 U . CHI. 
L. REV. 1391, 1414-15 (1992) (reviewing FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORA.TE LAW (1991)). 
26 ROMANO, supra note 5, at 33-34. 
27 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964). 
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out of time before we got to the casebook's merger chapter. We 
otherwise learned very little about mergers and management duties 
respecting them. Now, complex merger cases come up early in the 
term because of the wide variety of issues decided therein during 
the intervening quarter-century. They figure into the basic 
discussion of the allocation of authority between management and 
shareholders28 and in the presentation of the duty of care, 29 and they 
also take up a larger proportional place in discussions of fiduciary 
duty. When I try to explain these cases' results and the opinions' 
characteristics to my students, I find myself returning again and 
again to charter competition and its effects on litigation in Dela-
ware. 
Since I take the middle-ground view of charter competition, the 
notion of Delaware as a responsive sovereign figures into these 
explanations. Since I also subscribe to the notion that the charter 
competition system has a structural defect that causes corporate law 
to tilt markedly in the diredion of favoring management interests, 
however, Bill Cary's lessons always remain on the table in my class, 
although with a difference in emphasis. I speak of capture rather 
than corruption, omitting the public interest story of regulatory 
motivation that grounded Cary's denunciation of Delaware as a 
corrupt sovereign. What Cary characterized as defection from a 
duty to pursue the general good can be given a more technocratic 
gloss by reference to capture theories of regulation. These theories 
depict regulation as an arena in which special interests compete to 
use government power for advantage and make the public choice 
assumption that regulators should not be expected to behave 
differently than actors in private economic relations. 30 There is still 
a normative judgment at the bottom line, when the regulatory 
results are shown to be economically suboptimal. The self-inter-
28 See Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996) (holding stockholder vote dispositive); 
Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988) (holding directors violated duty 
of loyalty to shareholders). 
29 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (holding board negligent in 
shareholder class action suit). 
30 Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the 
Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 168-69 (1990). 
,, 
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ested behavior of the regulators thus emerges as an ordinary course 
phenomenon that prompts no special moral opprobrium.31 
However, neither does it prompt any sort of commendation. To 
the extent that Delaware does earn a commendation in the frame-
work of a capture model, it does so because it must answer to more 
than one interest group. Management remains the prime concern 
in this multiple demand picture, of course. But the system also 
allows shareholders, lawyers, and even judges to register competing 
demands. Although it remains pronounced, the tilt toward manage-
ment is not absolute. The cases take on a complex, mediative 
quality as they try to satisfy the competing claimants. This quality, 
in turn, disrupts student expectations. They come to the basic 
course expecting the cases to be principled in a narrow sense. 
Under the expected regime, judges are disinterested public servants 
whose empowerment and integrity follow from a commitment to 
common-law principles. The students expect the principles to come 
to bear in the cases from a dominant position, controlling rather 
than following from the facts even w bile building in possibilities for 
flexible application in the interest of justice. This rule of principle 
imports coherence to the system along with stability over time. A 
case law that is sold by its jurisdiction to business actors presents 
a stark contrast. It must remain responsive and subordinated to 
dynamically changing business fact patterns even as it mediates 
among conflicting interests. This causes it to be unstable over time 
and apparently disconnected from a rule of principle. I try to 
persuade my students that there is an important element of 
coherence nonetheless, and I draw on a multiple demand model of 
Delaware regulatory capture in trying to teach that lesson. Even so, 
Delaware's legitimacy from the point of view of the narrow rule of 
principle presents a very different question. I remit that question 
to the students to answer for themselves. It is their privilege to join 
Cary's judgment of corruption. I stress, however, that to do so 
automatically is to miss the point of the exercise . 
31 I find this point, by the way, a hard one to teach. Most students come to the class with 
the same public interest assumptions that inform Cary's article . They have an understand-
able inclination to join him in condemnation. 
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The succeeding parts of this Essay develop these points more 
fully. Part II sets out a multiple demand model of regulatory 
capture of Delaware. Part III brings the model to bear on the case 
law, looking at its impact, first on the judicial role, and second on a 
problem of indeterminacy much-discussed of late. 
II. A MULTIPLE DEMA.ND MODEL OF 
DELAWARE REGULATORY CAPTURE 
A. REINCORPORATION AND MANAGEMENT CONTROL 
In the standard story of regulatory competition theory, jurisdic-
tions can compete only to the extent that citizens have mobility 
among them. Free entrance and exit give the citizens a basis to 
choose, turning them into consumers of public goods and regulation. 
Citizen choice, in turn, deters regulatory capture. When interest 
groups gain undue influence and procure costly regulation, the 
citizens disadvantaged thereby exit the captured jurisdiction. 
Regulatory competition thus keeps regulators' attention focused on 
citizen preferences on the assumption that regulators do not like to 
see their citizens migrate elsewhere. Corporate charter competition, 
however, does not follow this pattern. Mobility and exit once again 
are the mainsprings. But capture is not thereby deterred because 
with corporations the capturing interest controls the mobile 
consumer and the system simultaneously deprives the disadvan-
taged interest of mobility. 
The system works well from the point of view of the chartering 
firm, considered as an entity without internal conflicts of interest. 
Exit through reincorporation gives the managers a potent ex post 
enforcement device that keeps the chartering state responsive to its 
interests. The chartering state's desire to continue to attract new 
incorporations discourages any blocking of the exit route for fear of 
scaring off future prospective incorporators. The combination of the 
state's rent incentive and the exit deterrent also mitigates any 
collective action problems the firms might encounter in getting 
needed legislation in the future. Should desired legislation not be 
obtained, exit can be effected unilaterally, and there will remain up 
to forty-nine states from which to choose. Since the chartering 
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state's rent flow includes fees to practicing lawyers in addition to 
franchise taxes, there always will be key actors on the supply side 
ready to work with the firms in securing regulation that suits their 
preferences. No trade association needs to be formed for the 
purpose of assuring effective lobbying. Delaware practice confirms 
this point. It delegates to its bar association both agenda control 
over, and drafting responsibility for, any amendments to its 
corporate code. The bar and legislature have a longstanding 
"understanding" that amendments to the corporations code must 
first be drafted and approved by the bar association's corporate law 
section and the bar association itself. 32 
Even as the charter system allows for exit from an unsatisfactory 
jurisdiction and compels the jurisdiction's lawmakers to attend to 
the preferences of the firms incorporated therein, it holds out no 
guarantee of responsiveness to the more particular preferences of 
the firms' shareholders. This imbalance stems from the fact that 
the exit privilege applies to firms rather than to shareholders, and 
corporate law has evolved under charter competition so as to block 
shareholder access to the determination of the firm's reincorporation 
decision. Although the shareholders have a vote respecting 
reincorporation, a favorable board vote must come first. Manage-
ment thus controls the agenda. 33 The market system holds out no 
route around this barrier because it creates no incentives to 
encourage the development of a shareholder-favorable state. Nor 
could the market for corporate control provide the shareholders any 
relief, even assuming the removal of antitakeover legislation. 
Successful control contests, whether by takeover or proxy fight, 
merely displace one group of managers with another. The displac-
32 See Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and Agency, 
15 DEL. J . CORP. L. 885, 899-901 (1990). The section itself performs the legislative function 
of sifting the comments of interested parties. Each of the three largest corporate servicing 
firms have representatives to the section. !d. at 899-901, 910. The legislature rubber stamps 
the bar's recommendations; the executive branch's role is limited to representation at bar 
association meetings on invitation. Id. at 898-99; see Moore et al., supra note 25, at 779-81 
(describing this "understanding" more fully). Active drafting and discussion is largely limited 
to the corporate law section. David S. Schaffer, Jr., Delaware's Limit on Director Liability: 
How the Market for Incorporation Shapes Corporate Law, 10 HARV. J. L. & PUB. PoL'Y 665, 
682-84 (1987). 
33 Bratton & McCahery, supra note 20, at 1929-36. 
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ing group, unless it has taken the firm private, remains in an 
agency relationship with the firm's shareholders and thus has no 
reason to look for a jurisdiction activated by the shareholder 
interest. Meanwhile, capture by charter competition exacerbates 
the shareholders' collective action problems even as it ameliorates 
management's problems. State law not only blocks shareholder 
access to the charter and the reincorporation machinery, it provides 
only management with routine compensation for expenses incurred 
in voting contests. 34 Finally, because of the peculiarities of our 
federal constitutional structure, the competing jurisdictions that 
lack an incentive to balance shareholder and manager interests 
have national lawmaking power over the shareholders of their 
domiciliary corporations. In the corporate variant of regulatory 
competition, then, exit from one jurisdiction provides no remedy for 
the dissatisfactions of the disadvantaged interest group. The 
system instead locks it in. 
The bar and the judiciary emerge as the only groups within the 
chartering state having any incentive to advance the shareholders' 
interest. The judicial role is discussed in Part III; here I note that 
only limited assistance can be expected from the bar. Litigating 
lawyers promote shareholder welfare as an incident to making a 
living as enforcers of the fiduciary deterrent. This focus is not the 
same as an interest in promoting shareholder value. For example, 
the lawyers have an incentive to promote lawmaking that enhances 
shareholder value by strengthening the corporate-control market 
only if the change will prompt additional litigable disputes. The 
same would go for lawmaking that enhances possibilities for 
relational monitoring by nominees of institutional shareholders. 
Shareholder-favorable incentives accordingly are unlikely to issue 
from the bar in practice. Fiduciary breaches that bring rents to 
lawyers stem from excess management influence; any market or 
self-regulatory governance strategy that has a cognizable chance of 
working well in practice ultimately threatens to diminish those 
34 This regime compensates only shareholder winners in board control contests and 
provides no compensation at all to shareholders who oppose management positions in issue 
contests. Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 128 N.E.2d 291, 293 (N.Y. 1955). 
For discussion, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal 
Policy Towards Proxy Contests, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1071, 1126-29 (1990). 
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rents by reducing the incidence of unproductive influence activities. 
In addition, the bar's interest diverges from the shareholders' 
interest even within the sphere of fiduciary enforcement, with the 
bar favoring a system that trades substantial money judgments to 
shareholders in exchange for substantial attorneys' fees. 
In short, no interest group in the chartering state has a rent 
incentive reliably tied to the advancement of the shareholders' 
interest in the minimization of agency costs within the firm. This 
situation leaves the shareholders to self-organize in order to 
advance an agenda in state lawmaking processes. The same 
collective action problem that prevents political action within firms, 
however, presumably makes this organization difficult. The charter 
competition system makes it even more difficult by structurally 
limiting prospects for payoffs: Any meaningful shareholder effort 
would have to register successfully in multiple jurisdictions.35 
B. COMPETING DEMANDS 
1. Threatened Federal Intervention as a Proxy for the Share-
holder Interest. The capture model of corporate lawmaking 
incentives should not be taken to imply a "race to the bottom" 
conclusion. Many matters of state corporate law find shareholder 
and management interests in alignment. In addition, the deal 
struck between the chartering state and management can never be 
entirely secure because the possibility of removal of corporate 
lawmaking to the federal level inheres in our federal constitutional 
structure. Delaware, as the entity most dependent on corporate law 
revenues, is the contracting state most prone to view that possibility 
as a threat. 
It seems safe to assume that Delaware actors remain highly 
averse to possible destructive exercises of federal preemptive power. 
Although this is a low-probability event, the potential level of injury 
to Delaware remains high and federal law reform discussions during 
the past twenty-five years have given occasional cause for concern. 
35 It comes as no surprise that federal law has emerged as the preferred venue for 
organized shareholder efforts to alter legal structures so as to make firms operate more 
effectively. 
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Federal assumption of the large fiduciary component of the corpo-
rate law product might deprive Delaware of the principal justifica-
tion for its premium price. An outbreak of price competition could 
follow in the market, along with erosion of Delaware's position as an 
informational center. Litigation business, meanwhile, would 
disperse across the country as plaintiffs shop for hospitable federal .. 
venues. Delaware actors accordingly have high-powered incentives 
to avoid exciting the creation of new federallaw. 36 This structural 
constant creates secondary incentives for Delaware lawmakers to 
respond to shareholder interests. 37 
Recognition of a perceived federal threat implies a model in 
which Delaware faces conflicting demands, each threatening 
potential negative consequences. First, the management interest 
must be satisfied to prevent corporate migration out of the state and 
entry into competition among competing states. Second, federal 
actors, as proxies for the shareholders, must be satisfied to avoid 
destructive intervention. The conflicting demands complicate the 
business of response; Professor Eisenberg has suggested that the 
conflict leaves Delaware with an incentive to avoid taking the lead 
in adopting rules favoring managers at the shareholders' expense. 
Other states have a different incentive. If they offer innovative side 
payments to management, they may siphon business from Dela-
ware; if the federal government intervenes to stop them, they lose 
little. So long as a given state has a small market share, its actions 
attract little attention. Delaware, in contrast, cannot take any 
significant steps without close scrutiny nationwide. 38 It remains 
under pressure to follow new developments elsewhere, but emerges 
in a mediative role. 
Evidence of the multiple demand model's robustness can be found 
in the pattern of Delaware lawmaking. Given statutory convergence 
and the dominance of the management interest, the problems of 
:JS Anecdotal evidence shows that Delaware lawmakers keep federal intervention in mind 
when they take politically sensitive steps. Alva, supra note 32, at 906-08. 
37 A number of commentators have recognized this possibility. Bebchuk, supra note 20, 
at 1455; Cary, supra note 1, at 688; Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation 
Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1512 (1989). 
38 Eisenberg, supra note 37, at 1512-13; see also Bebchuk, supra note 20, at 1455 
(pointing out that there remains range on which states can maneuver without fear offederal 
intervention). 
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conflicting demand show up only intermittently in the corporate 
legislative process. Anti-takeover legislation is the principal recent 
instance, and Delaware's corporate bar moved late and with caution 
in putting an anti-takeover statute before its legislature. 39 The 
conflicts become more apparent in the adjudication of fiduciary 
cases, as we will see in Part III. 
A question arises as to how Delaware, alone in this competing 
demand situation, can structure a mediative response without losing 
business in a market still keyed to management preferences. 
Delaware's mediative output can be explained in terms of the 
interests of managers as a group-well-timed interventions to 
protect shareholders serve to defuse the federal threat and to make 
Delaware a buffer state that protects corporations from federal 
intervention. The benefits of a mediative jurisprudence, however, 
are more questionable from the point of view of individual managers 
seeking an optimal environment. An individual manager's incentive 
would appear to lie in causing the firm to migrate to a state 
adopting a less equivocal anti-takeover policy and in free-riding on 
the firms that stay in Delaware. Of course, once a large number of 
firms did likewise over time, successfully shopping for more 
responsive jurisdictions, federal intervention would become more 
likely. The same thing might happen if a large number of firms left 
Delaware in a bunch, starting a new race to the bottom. 
Two factors make the multiple demand picture plausible in light 
of the constant threat of management exit. First, no full-service 
alternative domicile exists, and only a handful of other jurisdictions 
have strong incentives to incur the start-up costs to market a full 
service operation. None of thos€ potential competitors has any 
assurance that a third jurisdiction will not duplicate its efforts. 40 
Nor, given the low cost of reincorporation, 41 does the potential 
competitor have any assurance that its new customers will remain. 
39 See Alva, supra note 32, at 906-08 (discussing concerns regarding anti-takeover 
legislation in Delaware). 
40 See Ronald J. Daniels, Should Provinces Compete? The Case for a Competitive 
Corporate Law Market, 36 MCGILL L.J. 130, 182 (1991) (explaining "prisoner's dilemma" in 
which jurisdictions fear making investments that new competitors could duplicate or 
undermine). 
41 See BernardS. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 
84 Nw. U. L. REV. 542, 551, 574, 586-90 (1990) (noting low cost of reincorporation). 
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Second, the shareholders' newly discovered capability of self-
protective collective action may effectively deter management 
reincorporation proposals. Beginning in the late 1980s, incidents of 
shareholder resistance caused managers to drop the assumption of 
automatic shareholder approval of anti-takeover proposals requiring 
charter amendment. 42 Thus, departure from Delaware may not be 
the open option it used to be, and charters may have become 
somewhat embedded within the supposedly dynamic competitive 
system. 
2. The Bar as Interest Group. Full description of the incentives 
that shape Delaware law requires mention of conflicting interests 
on the supply side. Even as the managers implicitly rely on the 
Delaware bar to represent their interests in the state, manage-
ment's interests are far from perfectly aligned with those of the bar 
since litigation against managers provides a source of the bar's 
income. Delaware's process rules advance this local interest. The 
rules encourage derivative litigation, 43 making sure that the local 
bar gets a share of the action by requiring that Delaware lawyers 
make appearances and filings. 44 Competing demands also result in 
some systemic concessions to managers, but the concessions by no 
means counter Delaware's reputation as a fee-generating center for 
corporate lawyers. 45 
Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller have explained the litigation 
rules with a supply-side account that highlights the impact of 
42 See ROMANO, supra note 5, at 68-69 (discussing shareholder pressure on Pennsylvania 
firms to opt out of state's anti-takeover statute); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity 
Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 571 (1990) (noting that anti-takeover amendments that 
passed got only 50% to 60% of the votes). 
43 Delaware differs from many jurisdictions in not requiring plaintiffs in shareholder 
derivative actions to post security for expenses. DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1 (1991). Delaware 
facilitates service of process on nonresident directors with a broad consent to service statute. 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114 (Supp. 1998). Delaware also is liberal in its fee awards to 
derivative plaintiffs' lawyers. Under its nonpecuniary settlement practice, defending 
managers can trade a high fee for a small overall recovery. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future 
of Corporate Federalism: State Competition and the New Trend Toward De Facto Federal 
Minimum Standards, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 759, 761-62 (1987). 
44 DEL. SUP. CT. R. 12 (1991), DEL. CH. CT. R. 170 (1991). 
45 Cary, who favored strict fiduciary law control of management conduct, explained the 
concessions as a special exception keyed to the interests of the Delaware bar. Cary, supra 
note 1, at 686-88. 
1 
'·~ 
l 
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internal interest group politics on Delaware law. 46 Macey and 
Miller assert that, unlike Delaware, a state acting as a pure profit 
maximizer would limit legal fees incident to the domicile therein so 
as to maximize franchise tax revenues. 47 Delaware fails to conform 
to this product model's predictions because the bar acts as a small, 
cohesive interest group that extracts special concessions from the 
legislature at the expense of the general public. 48 
Macey and Miller rightly emphasize the organized bar's political 
power. However, two factors that align the interests of the bar with 
those of the rest of the state should be added to their description. 
First, the federal threat may temper the incentive of Delaware's 
lawyers to lobby for a reduction in direct charges to customers. 
Increasing Delaware's market share substantially above the level of 
one half of public incorporations would make Delaware even more 
of a "national" lawmaking center, enhancing its visibility and 
vulnerability to challenge at the national level. Given a state with 
a monopoly position, traditional federalism objections to interven-
tion carry less weight. Second, rules that encourage litigation in 
Delaware play a secondary role in production. As noted above, 
Delaware's case law and judges figure prominently in its substan-
tive law product line. Delaware, however, cannot unilaterally 
control the production of Delaware case law. The first option on the 
choice of the forum for new disputes tends to lie with the plaintiff, 
and in many instances Delaware law questions can be litigated in 
other states or in federal courts. This fact gives Delaware a reason 
to offer incentives to plaintiffs. Plaintiff cooperation gives Delaware 
the opportunity to apply its own law, preserving the first mover 
advantage and generating a flow of cases. These cases, in turn, are 
products sold in the charter market. The need to satisfy the 
demands of the national plaintiffs' bar reinforces the internal 
bargaining position of Delaware's bar, further explaining the state's 
delegation to the bar of the corporate legislative function. However, 
the delegation to the bar also helps to stabilize the capture arrange-
ment with management. 
46 Macey & Miller, supra note 22, a t 471-72. 
47 Id . at 472-73, 498, 503-04. 
48 Id. a t 504-08. 
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III. THE JUDICIARY AS INTEREST GROUP: DELAWARE 
CASE LAW AND MULTIPLE DEMANDS 
The Delaware judiciary plays an independent role in a multiple 
demand model. Its incentives are multifaceted. Like all judges, 
Delaware judges stake reputational capital in their working roles. 
As Delaware judges, they must pursue the state's interest in 
balancing the conflicting interest group demands. They accordingly 
act as mediators. But they are not merely arbitrators in robes. As 
judges, they have an independent reputational incentive to protect 
the legitimacy of the system in a public policy sense. 49 Delaware 
judges have represented a commitment to this aspect of the judicial 
role in the past, describing themselves as not only mediators 
between management and shareholders but also protectors of 
market risk-taking who nevertheless impose ethical constraints. 5° 
Finally, judges cannot escape expectations that they should operate 
under the rule of principle, narrowly defined. 
1. The Move to a More Even-Handed Mediation. Cary accused 
the Delaware courts of monolithic fidelity to management interests, 
citing a cluster of cases as evidence: (1) Chef{ v. Mathes, 51 which 
permitted management "with impunity" to spend corporate money 
to entrench itself against tender offers;52 (2) American Hardware 
Corp. v. Savage Arms Corp., 53 which refused to enjoin a defensive 
'
9 See Eric Rasmussen, Judicial Legitimacy as a Repeated Game, 10 J. L. ECON. & ORGS. 
63, 72-74, 78-80 (1994) (offering repeat game model of judicial motivation with infinite time 
horizons resulting in multiplicity of equilibria in which outcomes depend on players' 
expectations and showing that judges follow precedent if there is self-enforcing system based 
less on compulsion than need to uphold systemic legitimacy); see also Thomas J . Miceli & 
Mertin M. Cosgel, Reputation and Judicial Decisionmaking, 23 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 31, 
44-49 (1994) (modeling preferences of judges on utility function that includes both private and 
reputational component, with decision as to whether to follow precedent turning on trade off 
between two components, and equilibrium rate of adherence to precedent depending on 
distribution of preferences across population). 
50 See Moore et al., supra note 25, at 779-82 (describing views of then-associate justice 
of Delaware Supreme Court). They also have acknowledged the federal threat. See William 
T. Quillen, The Federal-State Corporate Law Relationship-A Response to Professor 
Seligman's Call for Federal Preemption of State Corporate Fiduciary Law, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 
107, 129 (1993) (stating that Delaware's "middle of the road" approach has ensured its 
position as premiere state of incorporation). 
51 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964). 
52 Cary, supra note 1, at 673-75. 
53 136 A.2d 690 (Del. 1957). 
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shareholders' meeting called on short notice or to act respecting a 
proxy statement the court acknowledged to be incomplete;54 (3) 
Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 55 which permitted firms to use 
charter amendments effected through common shareholder voting 
power to strip preferred stockholders of contract rights and first 
articulated the doctrine of independent legal significance;56 ( 4) 
Raritan v. Area Electronics, Inc., 57 which extended the doctrine of 
independent legal significance to mergers and acquisitions so as to 
assure a literal rather than purposive and policy-driven reading of 
the code;58 (5) Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien59 and Getty Oil Co. v. 
Skelly Oil Co., 60 both of which left the burden of proof on complain-
ing minority shareholders in conflict of interest situations;61 and (5) 
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., 62 which absolved 
management of a duty of care respecting subordinates' criminal 
conduct absent actual knowledge. 63 
The Delaware courts proved sensitive to Cary's allegations of 
corruption, 64 becoming noticeably more responsive to the share-
holder interest in the quarter century since 197 4. 65 Not all of the 
cases Cary cited are good law today. Chef{, a mainstay of manage-
ment takeover defensive practice, fell to Unocal66 and Revlon67 
during the takeover wars of the 1980s. Graham was undermined 
54 Cary, supra note 1, at 675-77. 
55 11 A.2d 331 (Del. 1940). 
56 Cary, supra note 1, at 677-78. 
57 188 A.2d 123 (Del. 1963). 
58 Cary, supra note 1, at 679. 
59 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971). 
60 267 A.2d 883 (Del. 1970). 
6 1 Cary, supra note 1, at 680-83. 
62 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963). 
63 Cary, supra note 1, at 683-84. 
6 1 ld. at 684, 696-98. 
65 For empirical confirmation, see Douglas M. Branson, Indeterminacy: The Final 
Ingredient in an Interest Group Analysis of Corporate Law, 43 V AND . L. REV. 85, 104-08 (1990) 
(presenting study of Supreme Court cases decided between 1974 and 1987 which shows larger 
number of proshareholder results than promanager results). 
66 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946,954-55 (Del. 1985) (noting changed 
circumstances since Chef( and applying expanded review of tender offer defensive tactics 
under proportionality test). 
67 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1985) 
(inventing duty of management to defend tender offer to auction company in limited 
circumstances). 
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more recently, 68 untenable in light of a generation of contrary 
management practice under the monitoring model of corporate 
governance.69 A similar fate could be suggested for Getty Oil. 
American Hardware might well come out differently today, given 
Unocal and other cases more closely scrutinizing management 
procedural manipulations70 and misrepresentations. 71 Havender 
and Hariton are still good law, but they operate in a less relentlessly · 
management-favorable context. A good faith duty to preferred 
stockholders has been acknowledged, 72 and mergers are subject to 
a more broad-ranging fiduciary scrutiny. Only Sinclair Oil stands 
unqualified. 
The break with the past first manifested itself in 1977 when 
Singer v. Magnavox Co. 73 imposed strict fiduciary standards on 
parent firms in cash-out mergers. Singer is famous for having come 
down after the Supreme Court removed an immediate threat of 
federal preemption of state fiduciary rules under the antifraud rules 
of the securities laws.74 The story told at the time was that the 
brush with preemption at the hands of the federal judiciary and the 
critical atmosphere provoked by Cary and others prompted the 
Delaware Supreme Court to reverse its direction so as better to 
accommodate the interests of investors and thereby diminish the 
possibility of future threats of intervention. The federal threat thus 
had impressed upon the Delaware courts the practical importance 
68 In re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 969-70 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
69 See E. Norman Veasey & William E . Manning, Codified Standard-Safe Harbor or 
Uncharted Reef? An Analysis of the Model Act Standard of Care Compared to Delaware Law, 
35 Bus. LAw. 919, 929-30 (1980) (discussing Getty). 
70 Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659-60 (Del. Ch. 1988) (confirming that 
deferential business judgment rule did not shield from scrutiny directors' decision to add two 
new members to board of directors because decision interfered with effectiveness of 
shareholder consent process). 
71 Zirn v. VLI Corp., 621 A.2d 773, 778 (Del. 1993) (confirming director duty of full 
disclosure to shareholders in connection with merger). 
72 See, e.g., HB Korenvaes Invs. v. Marriott Corp., 1993 Fed. Sec. L. Rep . (CCH) ,197,728 
(Del. Ch. 1993) (acknowledging such duty in context of proposed spin-off and special dividend 
to be paid to common stockholders). 
73 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). 
74 Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479-80 (1977). Prior to Santa Fe Industries 
there was a cognizable chance that much conduct covered by state fiduciary law would be 
found to be "manipulative" or "fraudulent" conduct violative of section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder. 
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of solicitude to shareholder interests. Note, however, that judicial 
reputations depend on comparisons with the performance of judges 
on other courts, state and federal. Thus, a critical atmosphere can 
arouse reputational concerns even with a less immediate federal 
threat. 
The Singer rule did not last long, being in turn rejected in 1983 
for a looser, process-based approach in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. 75 
However, the post-Cary behavior pattern persisted as the courts 
articulated unexpected new shareholder-protective applications of 
basic fiduciary rules. In addition to Unocal and Revlon, this 
occurred with Smith v. Van Gorkom76 and Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 
Inc., 77 both surprisingly aggressive in their applications of the duty 
of care to board approvals of proposed mergers, and in Paramount 
Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc. (In re Paramount 
Communications, Inc. Shareholders' Litigation), 78 with its broadly 
phrased directive to managers under hostile attack to enhance 
shareholder value. Less surprising but equally important is the 
recent invalidation of a delayed-redemption poison pill in Quickturn 
Design Systems, Inc. v. Shapiro. 79 The pattern is volatile, however. 
Equally famous cases restrict the application of the new rules. In 
addition to Weinberger, one thinks of Moran v. Household Interna-
tional, 80 with its validation of the poison pill, and Paramount 
Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 81 with its apparent allowance of 
extraordinary latitude to managers defending against a tender offer 
that disrupts preexisting plans for a friendly merger. Occasional 
trial balloons float around as well, like the Delaware Supreme 
75 457 A.2d 701, 704, 715 (Del. 1983) (overruling Singer in favor ofless restrictive process 
scrutiny of cash-out mergers). 
76 488 A.2d 858, 873-81 (Del. 1985) (expanding duty of care to cover board approval of 
arm's-iength merger). 
77 634 A.2d 345, 366-71 (Del. 1993) (applying heightened duty of care scrutiny of 
boardroom merger decision and suggesting expanded remedial concept inclusive of post-
merger gain). 
78 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994) (holding that management has obligation to achieve best value 
reasonably available for shareholders). 
79 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998). 
eo 500 A.2d 1346, 1356-57 (Del. 1985) (sustaining poison pill defense under Unoca[). 
81 571 A.2d 1140, 1150-54 (Del. 1989) (1imiting application of Unocal and Revlon). 
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Court's dicta that disinterested director and shareholder ratification 
justifies business judgment scrutiny of self-dealing transactions. 82 
This back-and-forth pattern is one of the big puzzles to be solved 
in a basic course. Direct charter market pressure does not appear 
to be implicated, although we certainly have seen its influence on 
the Delaware legislature during the past quarter century. There, 
we . also encounter one case of legislative modification of a 
shareholder-oriented ruling: After Smith v. Van Gorkom's applica-
tion of the duty of care caused nervousness in boardrooms and a 
substantial increase in insurance premiums, the legislature, 
prompted by the corporate committee of the state bar, amended the 
code to permit firms to opt out of the duty of care by charter 
amendment.83 However, in only one judicial opinion do we see a 
straightforward reconsideration and overruling of a previous case: 
Weinberger's rejection of Singer replaces a hastily-adopted, substan-
tive approach in favor of a more workable, process-based scrutiny. 
The other judicial switchbacks all purport to lie within the ordinary 
scope of stare decisis: The Delaware Supreme Court has a habit of 
loudly-perhaps too loudly-announcing that "applicable principles 
of established Delaware law"84 determine the result in the case. I 
tell my students that whenever they see this announcement, they 
should assume that from that point to the end of the opinion the 
court is making it up as it goes along. 
2. Indeterminacy and Management Tilt. At this point the 
credible Corporations teacher needs to address two points: (1) The 
cases' indeterminacy, which manifests itself to the students despite 
the courts' representations of fidelity to precedent, and (2) a 
persistent and perceptible tilt in management's favor, which 
manifests itself to the students despite the cases' thick fiduciary 
rhetoric. 
R
2 Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 466 (Del. 1991); Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 404 
(Del. 1987). Vice Chancellor Jacobs refused to base a holding on the dicta in In re 
Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc. Shareholders' Litigation, 663 A.2d 1194, 1204-05 (Del. Ch. 
1995). 
83 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1991) (permitting opting out of personal liability for 
directors for duty of care violations). 
8
' E.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 41 (Del. 
1993). 
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a. Indeterminacy. I do not think the indeterminacy point 
needs reproving in the context of this Symposium.85 It is sufficient 
to cite Ed Rock's report ofSamuelArsht's summary of Delaware law 
as follows: "Directors of Delaware corporations can do anything 
they want, as long as it is not illegal, and as long as they act in good 
faith." 86 The summary is accurate, provided that "legality" is 
understood to be defined in terms of adherence to process rules and 
bad faith is understood to be very hard to prove. Even given these 
qualifications, however, this standard is very broad. It is a standard 
that creates space for a volatile pattern of application in a world of 
dynamic deal-making, even as it also means that Corporations joins 
Torts as a course that really can be summarized on a single index 
card. 
Students have trouble comprehending a case law this open-
ended. Seen from a conventional point of view, it also is hard to 
teach. Delaware judges, reflecting a recognition of the importance 
of fidelity to the traditional conception of the judicial role, go to 
extraordinary lengths to explain new formulations of fiduciary law 
as inevitable results of prior precedents. While it would be wrong 
to dismiss their reasoning altogether and teach the cases as sui 
generis results of single-shot mediations, the cases certainly cannot 
be presented as the subjects for conventional lawyerly synthesis. 
Here not only do the fact patterns dominate principles, but princi-
ples come and go with unusual rapidity. 
Historical realism is my main explanatory strategy respecting 
this indeterminacy.87 As the 1980s takeover wave rose, the balance 
of interests between shareholders and managers shifted rapidly. 
One could not follow the traditional model of the judicial role of 
integrity and keep to a heavy-handed notion of stare decisis and at 
the same time do a good job in a politically sensitive and mediative 
role in a jurisdiction with a market position to protect. Something 
had to give, and in revolutionary times stare decisis is an obvious 
choice. The road from Chef! to Unocal to Time was bound to be 
85 Doug Branson's empirical confirmation, based on a study of Delaware Supreme Court 
opinions from 1984 to 1987, still stands. Branson, supra note 65, at 104-08. 
86 Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 
UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1015 (1997). 
87 For some alternative approaches, see Branson, supra note 65, at 108-12. 
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bumpy, given the complexity of interests at stake and the constantly 
changing market conditions. Of course, we still see volatility in the 
more relaxed conditions of the 1990s-in QVCthe Delaware Supreme 
Court takes another long look at tender offer defense and does not 
hesitate to undertake major rewriting.88 But historical explanation 
still works well. QVC is a further adjustment to a changing 
normative atmosphere. Shareholder value became a global norm in · 
the 1990s and managers building their resumes took care to 
enhance it. The old-fashioned, egotistical entrenchment displayed 
in the case had come to fall outside of business community stan-
dards. Time left a mess on the table for cleaning in any event. 
Finally, there was that second rule in the Delaware canon: Martin 
Davis always loses. 
The odd cases like Van Gorkom lend themselves particularly well 
to market-based historical explication. Van Gorkom came down 
early in the 1980s and showed us that the Delaware Supreme Court 
already sensed that it was about to see a mergers and acquisitions 
market unlike any in previous history. One year earlier the court 
had made a critical theoretical shift when it moved scrutiny of 
cashout mergers from a fairness basis to a process basis in Wein-
berger. Van Gorkom uses the duty of care, traditionally corporate 
law's purest process duty, to signal to the acquisitions market that, 
while Delaware would tolerate all sorts of antic dealmaking on 
substantive grounds and would refrain from show-stopping fairness 
scrutiny, it was going to insist that boardroom process records be 
squeaky clean and accord respect to shareholder value as the game's 
nominal object. That request was not unreasonable. Of course, Van 
Gorkom is a pathological case so far as concerns its business details. 
Thus, in my class there are two scapegoats for the excesses of the 
era: Michael Milken and Jerry Van Gorkom. 
It recently has been suggested that Delaware cases' indetermi-
nacy stems from more strategic concerns and amounts to an abuse 
of the state's dominant position in the charter market. The story is 
that indeterminate case law enhances Delaware's market position 
88 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 41 (DeL 1993). 
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by making its law incompatible with the law of other states. 89 If 
Delaware articulated a more conventional collection of rules and 
standards, it would be easier for other states to mark up Delaware 
law and go into competition. The states could then follow Delaware 
law even as they made their own corporate law, enhancing their 
attractiveness to reincorporating firms. To the extent that Dela-
ware law is indeterminate, in contrast, it cannot successfully be 
adopted by a potential competitor. As soon as the competing state 
signs on to the existing body of precedents, Delaware goes off in 
another direction, leaving the competitor out of conformity. 
Indeterminacy, then, makes Delaware the only state that can make 
Delaware law. This fact enhances the value of the Delaware 
judiciary in the charter market and decreases the chance that 
another state can replicate what Delaware has to sel1. 90 But the 
result is suboptimal from the point of view of Delaware's customers; 
determinacy is vital to business actors, who want to be able to plan 
the future with certainty and execute transactions with a minimal 
risk of liability.91 This result nevertheless is a rational course for 
Delaware to take so long as that diminution in value of the law to 
its customers is less than the diminution in value of other states' 
laws to their customers.92 At the same time, indeterminate law 
triggers more litigation, giving the Delaware courts more chances to 
show off their expertise in the charter market and enhance their 
reputational value. 93 
The last point above might be fair. Otherwise this analysis 
strikes me as a wrongheaded application of the "law as product" 
analogy, which, like freedom, needs to be limited for the sake of its 
own preservation. 
Delaware's first-mover advantage can be explained much more 
simply, without reference to the idea of network benefits and 
technical compatibility. 94 As noted above, it is not Delaware's code 
89 Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 
98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1927-28 (1998). 
90 ld. 
91 ld. at 1919. 
92 Id. at 1931. 
93 ld. at 1935. 
9
'
1 The basic application is described in Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, 
and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757 (1995). 
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but its personnel and their reliable customer service incentives that 
keep it ahead and deter market entry by a competing state. A 
potential competitor would have to create courts of experts as 
knowledgeable as Delaware's existing bench. This process would be 
difficult. Well-known, experienced corporate lawyers would have to 
be recruited to the bench despite uncertainty respecting competitive 
success. 
Such a speculative venture calls for an entrepreneurial initiative 
of a sort usually seen only in the private sector. However, even if a 
second state actually put together a plausible court and proceeded 
to compete on the basis of price, it is not clear that compatibility 
with Delaware law would present a problem. If Delaware's law 
really is suboptimal to its customers due to indeterminacy, then the 
competing state gets something to sell: clear precedents respecting 
mergers and acquisitions that provide a basis for management 
planning. Such a strategy implies incompatibility, which in turn 
means that corporate lawyers would have to incur the costs of 
learning the new, competing line of precedents. But at this point in 
the scenario, entrepreneurial incentives are easy to assume, 
provided that the competing state's precedents really do add value. 
A subset of corporate lawyers expert in the new law would appear 
overnight to sell reincorporation into the new state, a fee-generating 
event. The only requisite is that the new state, like Delaware, allow 
lawyers nationwide to give opinions as experts in its law, an easy 
concession to make. In sum, when conditions are right, business 
law institutions can change overnight without being retarded by 
sunk costs in precedent legal institutions. The wildfire spread of the 
limited liability company presents a recent example. 95 Network 
benefits simply do not seem to lock out business law innovations 
where client demand is strong. 
More importantly, it is not at all clear that Delaware's case law 
really creates an opening for a competing state. In theory, of course, 
indeterminacy does make law less valuable to the firm as a whole 
95 For a law-as-product explanation of this possibility that rejects a regulatory 
competition overlay, see William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, An Inquiry into the 
Efficiency of the Limited Liability Company: Of Theory of the Firm and Regulatory 
Competition, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 629, 657-86 (1997). 
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in that an expanded range of possibilities means more risk, and 
more risk diminishes value. The question in practice is whether 
managers operating in an uncertain, second-best world, rather than 
the firm as a whole, really would prefer the hypothesized level of 
legal certainty. Presumably, enhanced certainty would be beneficial 
to them if it implied no tradeoffs. For example, a "just say no" rule 
respecting takeover defense would import certainty96 and also make 
life easier for managers. But such a regime would carry tradeoffs 
in a world with multiple demands. 
Clear rules import policy transparency, disabling the mediative 
lawmaker. As we have seen, corporate managers find it in their 
interest to stay with Delaware, even though Delaware does not have 
the most management-favorable code, because Delaware's mediative 
nods in the shareholders' direction have protected corporate law 
from federal intervention. A set of strong, clear rules pitched to the 
management side would enhance the risk of wakening the federal 
dragon. This risk is not a de minimis possibility, particularly in an 
activist era in which actors in the capital markets publicly monitor 
corporate governance developments. At the same time, a set of 
strong, clear rules pitched to the shareholder side are manifestly 
against Delaware's interest in maintaining its market position and 
against the interests of its primary customers. 
As a third possibility, one could hypothesize a clear set of rules 
designed to clarify and stabilize the balance that Delaware main-
tains today. Presumably, such a set of rules would attempt to 
embed prevailing precedents in the slavish manner of a restate-
ment, uniform code, or student outline. The question then arises 
whether Delaware's business customers really want such a stable 
rulebook. For simplicity, let us assume that litigation volume 
decreases in a world with this rulebook, 97 but that it by no means 
disappears. Planning accordingly does not become certain, even as 
probability distributions become tighter. This situation arguably 
enhances value. But it carries a cost. Embedded rules imply a 
sacrifice of responsiveness to marketplace developments-what we 
96 See Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 18, at 1191 (noting "pro-uncertainty tilt" of 
Delaware law because it lacks such firm anti-takeover provisions). 
97 I make the assumption only for argument's sake. 
472 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:447 
had when earnings value was based on a five-year past average as 
a matter of precedent. Under present Delaware law, there is always 
room to validate a new transaction and the lawyer consistently 
takes the role of facilitator. Under locked-in rules, the lawyer could 
sometimes revert to the old-fashioned role of naysayer, something 
clients do not want to see. 
In sum, even if we assume that indeterminacy carries cognizable 
costs for the clients, it is not clear that the traditional alternative 
holds out benefits sufficient to justify a change of direction. This 
ambiguity is especially the case when the clients are entrepreneurs, 
whose concern lies with the next deal and not with the neatness of 
the past pattern of cases. One wonders whether Delaware's 
business customers are bothered at all by the untidy pattern of its 
cases. The real complainants are formalist lawyers and legal 
academics unable to adjust to a politicized common-law regime that 
disempowers them even as it generates fees (and articles). 
b. Management Tilt. The foregoing rebuttal of the indetermi-
nacy charge presupposes a judicial tilt toward the management side. 
It in fact is not difficult for a lawyer to coax clear instructions from 
Delaware's process precedents. How hard is it to appoint a special 
committee with an independent lawyer and investment banker and 
then to negotiate with it at arm's length? Not hard at all, and the 
problem lies in the fact that the negotiation process costs the 
management client money and inhibits its freedom of action. 
Indeterminacy creeps into the cases because the client pushes 
against the process envelope and the matter is later litigated in 
front of a court disinclined to find liability. If the client/customer 
who has gone over the edge is indeed to be let off the hook, the 
statement of the rule evolving in the cases is bound to become 
somewhat convoluted. 
This problem is compounded by the fact that judicial role 
integrity requires that the result of such a case be justified in terms 
of the fiduciary principle. vVhen management-favorable results are 
smuggled in under a haze of fiduciary verbiage, fiduciary rule 
statements look indeterminate because they do not in fact determine 
the result of the case. 
Arguably, this rhetorical skill is an important aspect of the 
Delaware courts' expertise. If, for example, we review the pattern 
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of Delaware decisionmaking during the height of the takeover era, 
the inference arises that the Delaware courts took advantage of 
information asymmetries to develop a body of law that gave an 
appearance of greater weight to shareholder interests than is 
justified on close inspection of actual results. In the handful of 
highly-publicized cases, the courts announced vague standards that 
held out the prospect of enhancement of shareholder value. In the 
less well-publicized cases that followed, however, they took the 
opportunity held out by complex facts to refrain from applying the 
standards in management-constraining ways.98 The full set of 
results tallied by the lawyers who make reincorporation decisions 
signaled considerably more room for management maneuver than 
did the public profile signaled by the leading cases. 
Edward Rock has highlighted another aspect of this phenomenon. 
He shows that Delaware judges use the cases' complex fact patterns 
to make moral pronouncements about management behavior. The 
culpable manager, however, is not hit necessarily with an injunction 
against his or her deal or a money judgment.99 Instead, the court 
announces its dissatisfaction with the manager's conduct in the 
course of denying an injunction against the transaction or dismiss-
ing the complaint. It is the actor replicating the disapproved 
conduct in the subsequent deal who risks a negative judgment. 100 
Rock explains this judicial behavior pattern in normative terms. 
Delaware judges operating in this mode, duly connected to the 
business community through a network of lawyers and investment 
bankers, communicate normative standards. They thereby perform 
the moral side of the judicial role. Significantly, the resulting 
behavioral deterrent is reputational rather than financial. 101 
I cannot fault Rock's description, but I would like to expand on its 
implications. I agree that when Delaware judges take the moral 
role, they do so more in the mode of preachers than as traditional 
98 For a reading of the cases after Unocal along these lines, see VICTOR BRUDNEY & 
WILLIAM W . BRATION, BRUDNEY & CHIRELSTEIN'S CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE 
FINANCE 1087-95, 1129-30 (4th ed. 1993). 
99 A money payment (probably in the form of a settlement) may follow where the 
injunction against the deal is denied but the complaint is not dismissed. Rock, supra note 86, 
at 1039. 
100 Id. at 1023-39. 
101 I d. at 1012-16. 
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sovereign enforcers. But the similarity obtains less because 
preachers can impair one's reputation when they denounce one 
publicly than because talk is the only weapon they have in a world 
in which church and state are separate. Moral suasion is the 
preacher's enforcement device and he or she must live with the 
knowledge that more than a few congregants nod agreement and 
then cheerfully go home to live miscreant lives. Delaware judges 
operate like preachers because charter competition prevents them 
from assuming the conventional judicial role of positive law 
enforcer. In the conventional setup, only the legislature acts 
prospectively. The litigant who breaches an extant duty on a new 
fact pattern loses the case and pays a judgment. It is hard to see 
from an abstract perspective what makes corporate managers such 
delicate beings that they require an exemption from the ordinary 
rules of the game. The point must be that the exemption has been 
purchased. 
Rock confronts the point as follows: 
In the corporate context, however, the assumption 
of "direct deterrence" is particularly implausible: 
There are hundreds of corporations, the directors 
and officers of which have comprehensive liability 
insurance; damage liability is extremely rare; and, 
after the enactment by Delaware of section 
102(b)(7) of the General Corporation Law, which 
allows Delaware corporations to opt out of director 
liability for breach of the duty of care, damage 
liability has become even rarer. If the principal 
sanction is not directly financial but reputational, 
then one must explain how this sanction works, an 
account entirely absent from the standard account. 
And yet the system seems to work. 102 
And work the system does, with reputational enforcement playing 
at best a secondary role and the residual prospect of an injunction 
or damages playing the primary role. The system appears to satisfy 
102 Id. at 1012 (citation omitted). 
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management, which is happy to pay attorneys to churn litigation 
that rarely entails more substantial costs in terms of money 
judgments or lost deals. Clearly the lawyers also are satisfied. For 
the shareholders, the system is more problematic even in our era of 
global shareholder valuism. But it still is clearly superior to the 
pre-Cary system. 
The question, moreover, is not whether the reputational enforce-
ment system does or does not work. Of course it works. The 
question is whether it might work better if Delaware deployed its 
injunctive power more liberally in cases of management defalcation. 
Unfortunately, we shall see no experiments with that alternative 
approach because charter competition locks Delaware into its 
present pattern. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Those of us who would prefer to see fiduciary cases that more 
vigorously protect the shareholder interest can complain about 
Delaware cases as we teach and write about them. But we cannot 
reasonably expect to see a significant shift in the decisional pattern 
so long as management's voice remains strongest amidst the 
multiple voices that register demands in Delaware. Nor can we 
reasonably attack the role integrity of Delaware's judges. They do 
precisely what their sovereign principal demands of them, display-
ing the finest loyalty. 
